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An n-person Bargaining Problem consists of a pair (5, d) where S C ft" is a set of feasible
utility vectors which the players may obtain through cooperation, and the point d £ 5.
called the disagreement point, is interpreted as the utility that players receive if they fail
to reach an agreement. Given a class of bargaining problems, S n
,
a solution is a map that
associates with each problem (5, d) in E n a unique point in S. In this paper, we investigate
the Nash solution on a domain of comprehensive but not necessarily convex problems. We
argue that even with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, restricting attention to convex
problems limits the application of the theory. Without convexity the Nash solution is not
well defined. We propose a new solution called the Nash Extension. This solution coincides
with the Nash solution when S is convex and is characterized by weak Pareto optimal-
ity, symmetry, scale invariance, continuity, and a new axiom, contraction monotonicity.
Finally, we present a non-cooperative game that implements the Nash extension solution.
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An n-person bargaining problem consists of a pair (5, d) where S is a non-empty subset
of 3£™, and d £ 5. The set 5 is interpreted as the set of utility allocations that are attainable
through joint action on the part of all n agents. If the agents fail to reach an agreement,
then the problem is settled at the point d, which is called the disagreement point. A
bargaining solution F, defined on a class of problems E n
,
is a map that associates with
each problem (S,d) £ S n a unique point in S. In the axiomatic approach to bargaining
we start by specifying a list of properties (Pareto optimality, for example) that we would
like a solution to have. If it can be shown that there is a unique solution that satisfies a
given list of axioms, then the solution is said to be characterized this list.
It is common to restrict the domain to problems with convex feasible sets. However,
bargaining problems can arise from a variety of political, social and economic situations.
The requirement that S be convex seems to remove many important cases from considera-
tion. For example, the image in utility space of a finite set of resource allocations will be a
finite set of points, not a convex set. Or consider the bargaining problem associated with
an economy in which strong externalities are present. It is quite likely that the feasible set
of such a problem will be non-convex.
This restriction of domain is often justified by assuming that agents' preferences can
be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Feasible sets may then
be convexified by running lotteries over the original elements. However, the proposition
that agents satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions of preference relations are
often rejected in the empirical literature (for example, see Machina( 19S4)). and serious
questions of interpretation remain in any (went. In particular, if a problem is settled at
a lottery then the axioms that characterize the solution are only satisfied in expectation,
and not, in general, by the actual utility allocations that agents walk away with after the
lottery is held. Thus, even if we accept the von Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions on
preferences, we must still decide whether the that axioms should be satisfied by the ex-anti
or ex-post allocations.
1
This question is important if bargaining theory is viewed as a method of prescrib-
ing settlements to social distribution problems that are '"fair' 1 or "ethical". Under this
interpretation, the axioms that characterize the solution employed are equivalent to a de-
scription of the ethical values of the society. For example, consider a society with two
agents. Suppose that slavery is permitted in this society, and that if one agent is a slave
and the other the master, the utility allocations are and 10 respectively. If both agents
are freemen, then each gets a utility allocation of 2. Also suppose that we are egalitarian
enough to be believe in symmetry and Pareto optimality. Then if we allow lotteries, the
problem is settled by flipping a fair coin to determine who is to be slave and who is to
be master. However, would be difficult to argue that a society in which half the agents
are slaves is egalitarian or even symmetric. In this case, the ex-post notion of fairness is
the appropriate one. This can also be viewed as a choice between fairness of opportunity
and fairness of result. 1 Allowing problems to be settled at lotteries is equivalent to decid-
ing that outcomes med not satisfy out ethical notions. In many situations, this may be
inappropriate and restrictive.
Following Zeuthan and Harsanyi, bargaining theory may also be used to help un-
derstand certain non-cooperative situations. Consider, for example, the case of mediator
attempting to settle a labor dispute. Mediation is predicated on the belief that if agents
are persuaded that a particular division is "fair", then they will voluntarily agree to co-
ordinate their actions and accept the allocation as a settlement to their problem. Thus.
the axioms summarize what the mediator believes the agents are likely to accept as fair.
Here the choice of whether or not to allow settlements that are only ex-anti fair depends
upon whether or not the agents can sign binding contracts to abide by the outcome's of
lotteries. If they cannot, then any settlement that is not ex-post fair will break clown
after the lottery is held. Thus, lotteries must be rejected as possible settlements in such
problems even if agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences.
In this paper we concentrate on extending the Nash solution to the domain of coni-
We thank Charles Kahn for this suggestion.
prehensive but not necessarily convex bargaining problems. 2 In section two we clefin
axioms and mathematical objects used in subsequent sections. In section throe we prop< i i
a new solution called the Nash extension and give an axiomatic character: lis-
cuss the reasons why the ordinary Nash solution is not well defined on this domain, and
argue that our extension has several important properties that alternative generalizations
in the literature fail to satisfy. In section four we describe a non-cooperative game that
implements the new solution. This is a particularly important aspect of this paper giv
the Gibbard-Satherwaite impossibility theorem which tells us agents would not truthfully
respond if they were asked to report their utility functions directly. The game requires
agents to bid for first mover advantage in the manner of Moulin's(19S4) game (which im-
plements the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution). Subsequently, players can make offers in the
manner of the Rubinstein-Binmore (10S2) game (which implements the Nash solution).
Our result is akin to that of Rubinstein and Binmore. We show that in the limit, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff is exactly the utility allocation prescribed by
our proposed solution to the cooperative game.
In ;i companion paper, Conley and Wilkie( 1989), we also study the Kalai Sm dinsk} and tin ejj ilil irian
-d[ii I ion-- on t Ins domain.
2. Definitions and Axioms
We start with some definitions and formal statements of the axioms used in the -
characterizations. Given a point d £ 3£n , and a set S C 3£n , we say S is d- comprehensive if
d < x < y and y £ S implies x £ 5. 3 The comprehensive hull of a set S C 3£n , w?^/i respect
to a point d £ !K n is the smallest d-comprehensive set containing S:
comp(S; d) = {x £ 3^n | x £ S or 3 y £ 5 such that d < x < y}. (1)
The convex hull of a set S C 3Rn is the smallest convex set containing the set 5:
ra+l n+1
CO?2 (5) = < x £ 3£n | x = ]T A.y, where ^ A, = 1, A, > V z, and ij{ £ 5 V z > . (2)
i=i i=i
Let C denote the space of compact subsets of $R n . The Hausdorff distance p : C x C —> 3£
is destined by,
p(S, S') = < max max mm || 2' — y || ; max mm || a; — y
x£S' t/£S x£S y£S'
(3
where • is the Euclidean norm. A closed e-ball around x is defined as:
#e(s)a-{z€»n | ||*-*|| <^1-
Let int(S) denote the interior of 5, and 5(5) the boundary of 5.
Define the weak Pareto frontier of S as:
W\P(S) = {x £ 5
| y > x implies y & S}.
The vector inequalities are represented by >, >, and ^>.
(5)
9Define the strong Pareto frontier of S as:
P(S) = {x e S
| y > x implies y £ S}. (6)
A bargaining problem (S,d) is said to be strictly comprehensive if 5 = comp(S.J) and
WP(S) = P(S). Roughly, this means that S is d-comprehensive, and the Pareto frontier
has no vertical or horizontal segments. The domain of bargaining problems considered in
this paper is S". This is defined as the class of pairs (5, d) where S C 3£n and d G ft" such
that:
Al ) S is compact.
A2) S is d-comprehensive.
A3) There exists x G S and x ^> d.
This differs from the usual domain, which we denote S"on , in that we do not assume that
the set of feasible utility allocations is convex. A bargaining solution, F, is a function from
££ to ft" such that for each (S,d) G EJ, F(5,r/) G 5.
A list of axioms used in this paper follows. Readers familiar with axiomatic bargaining
theory may wish to skip to the definition of Compromise Monotonicity. All bargaining
problems mentioned below are assumed to be elements of E™.
Pareto- Optimality (W.P.O.): F{S,d) G WP(S).
Contraction Independence (C.IND)4 : If S' C S, d' = d, and F{S,<1) G 5'. then F{S\d') =
F(S,d).
A pcrin.at.at.io-n, operator. -. is a bijection from {1,2 /? } to {1,2 rc }. 11" is the class





5 and tt(5) = {.7 G ft" .(/ =
~( x
I
for some .r G 5}.
C.IND was introduced by Nash(1950) with the label "Independence of Irrelevanl Alternate
Superscripts stand for the components of a vector
Symmetry (SYM): If for all permutation operators it £ IT n , tt(S) = S and ~{d) = d. then
F i {S,d) = Fi{S,d)\/i,j.
An affine transformation on 3ftn is a map, A : 3£ n —> 3Rn , where A(a-) = a + ox for some
a £ 3£'\6 £ 3^4.+ . A
n
is the class of all such transformations. Let X(S) = {y £ K n | y =
A(x), x £ 5}.
Scale Invanance (S.INV): V A £ A n , F(\(S),\(d)) = \(F{S,d)).
Continuity (CONT): For all sequences {(5",d)}~ n if p(S,S") -> 0, then F{S'\d) -»
F(S,d).
The /(/ea/ Point of a problem (S,d) is defined as:
a(S, <i) = (max .r 1
,
max x~, . . . , max .7
,ri
). (7)i£5 i£S j: £ S
x~> d x~> d x~> d
Restricted Mono tonicity (R.MON): If S C 5', d = <f, and «(S,(/) = a(S',d'), then
F{S',d') > F{S,d).
The Compromise Point with respect to a solution F of a problem (S, d), is defined as:
c
F
(5, d) =? F(con(5),d). (8)
Now Compromise Monotonicity is formally defined:
Compromise Monotonicity (C.MON): If 5' C 5, d' = d, and c (S,d) £ con(S'). then
F(5,d) > F(S',d').
Recall the motivation behind R.MON. We imagine each agent submitting a claim to
level of utility. If it is possible to satisfy all the claims then we do so. If not then we take
the vector of claims as an "ideal point", a point we would like to achieve but cannot reach.
The actual solution must be feasible but should somehow take this ideal point into account.
In particular, suppose we have a bargaining problem that undergoes an expansion of the
feasible set (perhaps because of economic growth), in a way that leaves the ideal point
and the disagreement point unchanged. Then the solution to the larger problem should
leave all the agents at least as well off as they were at the solution to the original problem.
Hi
»In short, R.MON is an axiom which gives a minimal property that the compronn-< av
from the ideal point should satisfy.
The motivation for C.MON is similar. Instead of having agents submit claims, we
imagine each agent proposing a feasible allocation as a settlement. If all the proposals
agree, then the problem is settled. If not, then we imagine agents agreeing to "meet
each other halfway". 6 If the feasible set is convex, then this compromise is feasible. If
not, then we can think of the solution to the convex hull of the feasible set as being an
"ideal compromise" which is not attainable. The actual solution must be feasible but
should somehow take this compromise point into account. In particular, suppose we have
a bargaining problem that undergoes an expansion of the feasible set in a way that leaves
the compromise point and the disagreement point unchanged. Then the solution to the
larger problem should leave all the agents at least as well off as they were at the solution
to the original problem. And so, C.MON is an axiom that gives a, minimal property that
the compromise away from the ideal compromise should have.
Or to make some more general compromise, meeting each other on<- third of the way along the line betwci n
the first and the second agents proposals for example. Different vectors of compromise weights might n
different levels of bargaining power or toughness.
3. The Solutions
In his 1950 paper, Nash considered the domain S"on of convex problems. He proposed
the following solution:
N(S,d) = I argmax JJ(xi - d x ) \ , (9)
y
x
x >d i=i j
and demonstrated that it is the uniquely characterized by W.P.O, SYM, S.INV, and C.IND.
Kaneko(19S0) offers a characterization of the direct generalization of Nash solution on the
domain of "regular" bargaining problems. This domain is a superset of E". However,
Kaneko's solution is not single-valued and is only upper-hemicontinuous. Thus his solution
does not give an unambiguous recommendation of how to solve bargaining problems. In
addition, small changes in the problem can lead to large changes in the outcome. This is the
justification for Nash's inclusion of single-valuedness and continuity in his list of minimal
requirements that bargaining solutions ought to satisfy. Herrero's(19S9) generalization
suffers from similar problems. She defines a generalization on the strictly comprehensive
two person domain which gives outcomes that are a superset of the outcomes recommended
by Kaneko's solution. Her solution is also multi-valued and satisfies a form of lower-
hemicontinuity. Foster and Vohra(19SS) give a characterization of the Nash solution on
a domain in which the feasible set is not necessarily convex, but in which the maximizer
of the Nash product is assumed to be unique. It is not clear what class of economic or
political problems would give rise to such a domain. A natural suggestion would be to
define a new solution by taking a selection from the set of maxiinizers of the Nash product.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to do this in a way that satisfies the properties enjoyed by
.V on the convex domain. Obviously, no such selection satisfies SYM. In addition, it can
be shown that any such selection must also fail to satisfy the axioms CONT and C.IND.
Thus, we need a solution that is continuous and single valued, coincides with the; Nash
solution if the problem is convex, and approximates the Nash solution otherwise. The Nash
extension solution meets all of these requirements. We construct the Nash extension as
follows: First define the mapping L : ££ —> 3ft n as:
L(Sjd) = com N(con(S),d),d). (10j
L{S,d) is the line segment connecting the disagreement point d. to the Nash solution of
the problem composed of the convex hull of 5, and d. Now we define the solution NE:
NE(S,d) = {maxz
|
x G I(5,c?)n5}, (11)
Figure 1: The Nash extension solution.->
where max indicates the maximal element with respect to the partial order on li". The
construction of NE is illustrated in figure 1. The point NE{S,d) is the intersection of
the weak Pareto frontier of S and the line segment connecting the disagreement point and
compromise point under the Nash solution the problem (S,d). Obviously. NE coincides
with A on the domain of convex problems. To see that the NE solution is single valued.
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notice that I is a non-empty, compact-valued correspondence. Then since L is also a
line segment, its maximal element exists and is unique. Thus. NE is non-empty and
single-valued on £™. Lemma 1 shows that the NE solution is continuous.
Lemma 1. NE is continuous on £".
Proof/
Let S u —> S. We begin by showing that con is a /^-continuous correspondence. To see
this, suppose that for any given e > 0, p(5, S") < e. Then for any y = Yl7=i a ' Xl ^ con(S)
there is a y
v
= X^T=i a i x *i ^ con{S
u
) such that y £ B e (y u ). By reversing the argument,
we also find that for any y
u £ con(S u ) there is a y £ con(S) such that y" £ B
€
(y). Thus
if p(S,S") < e then p(con(S), con{S u )) < e, and so co?i is p-continuous.
Therefore, since co?2 is continuous, and iV is continuous on Yl'con^ ^he composition
map c iV
,
where cN (S, d) = N{con(S),d), is continuous by Hildenbrand(1974) proposition
B.7. We conclude that if S" -> 5, then cN {S 1/ ,d) -> c iV (S,d).
By Definition, NE{S,d) £ L(5,d). So NE(S,d) = (1 - A*)d + \*cN (S,d) for some
A* £ [0.1]. Also, for each 5", NE{S\d) = (1 - A")d + \ v cN(S v ,d) for some A" £ [0.1].
Notice that the sequence {A''} is drawn from the compact set [0,1]. Thus, given any
sequence of sets {S^} converging to S, if it can be shown for every convergent subsequence
{A"*} of {A") that A" fc —+ A* then the lemma is proven. Suppose not. Then there are two
cases:
1. Suppose first that for some subsequence {S" fc }, A"* —» A and A > A*. Then the
definition of NE implies (l-\)d+\cN(S,d) =x & S. Thus the sequence {NE{SUk )}
converges to a point not in 5, contradicting the hypothesis S" k —> S.
2. Now suppose that for some subsequence {S Uk } that A"* —> A and A < A*. Then
(1 - \)d + Ac iV (5, d) = x < NE(S,d). Additionally, the existence of a point S that
strictly dominates d implies that d <C x. Hence by the d-comprehensiveness of S.
x £ int(S). Thus there exists e > and v\ such that for v > i/i, B ( (.r) C S""* and
NE(S,d) g Be (x). Since cN (S^,(/) -+ c-v (5,ci), there exists i/2 such that ?> > i/2
implies L(S" fc
,
J) n £,(.?•) ^ 0. Now, for each vk let y"* = max{L(5"'\d) n J5, ( .? )} . Let




rf) —* x, so there exists i/' such that i/jt > v" implies NE{S Vk . d) £
m*(£ e (x)). Then for vk > max{i/',i/"}, we have y"* G S'yt n L(S Uk ,d) and y"* >
NE(SVk ,d), contradicting the definition of NE. Hence for every subsequence of S'\
we have that A = A*. Therefore, x = NE(S,d).
Our main result is a characterization of the new solution NE.
Theorem 1. A solution on E£ satisfies W.P.O, S.V, SYM, C.MON, and CONT if and
only if it is the Nash extension.
Proof/
(a) First it is shown that the NE solution satisfies the axioms.
W.P.O: Let x = NE(S.d). Assume there exists ij £ 5 such that y ^> x. Then since S
is d-comprehensive there exists z £ L(S,d) fl S such that z ^> x. However, this
contradicts the hypothesis x = NE(S,d).
S.INV: Let (5. d) £ E" and A £ A" be any affine transformation. Since con{\(S)) —
A(con(5)), and N satisfies S.INV on E£on , we conclude that A'( A(con(5)), A(r/j) =
\(N(con{S),d)). Thus L(X(S),X(d)) =\(L(S,d)). Therefore, max{Z(A(S), \{d))
MS)} = max {\(L(S,d) n 5)} = \(NE(S,d)), as required.
S\ M: Let (5, d) be a symmetric problem. Then (con(S), d) is also a symmetric problem.
Since N satisfies SYM on E£on , N{con(S).d) is a point of equal coordinates. But
so is d, and so all elements L(S.d) are points of equal coordinates. Consequently,
NE(S.d) E L(S,d) is symmetric.
C.MON: Let (S,d),(5',c?') be such that; 5 C 5'. d = d' and cNE(S',d') E con(S). Then
A'(co/?(S'M') = NE(con(S'),d') = cNE{S',d'), and therefore N(con{S'),d') £
ro//(5). Since con(S) C con(S'), and A' satisfies C.IND on ££,„, iV(co7i( 5). J) =
N(con(S'),d'). Furthermore since J = d' by hypothesis, L{S.d) — L(S'.d').
Therefore S C S' implies NE(S,d) < NE{S',d'), as required.
CONT: See lemma 1.
(b) Conversely let F be a solution on E£ satisfying the five axioms, and consider any
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problem (S,d). By S.INV, we can set d = and N(con(S),d) = (1,1,..
Then NE(S, d) = (a, . .
.
, a) = x for some a > 0. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1) Sc3fc£.
Let the sets T and V be defined as follows,
c.
T = concomp((n, 0, . .
.
, 0), (0, n, . . . , 0), (0, . . . , n); c?) (12)
7 = T\ {* + £!?,}. 13
Since c = N(con(S)
,
cf) , the hyperplane defined by ^"
=1 -r < = ' 7 supports con(S) at c.
Hence 5 C T. Also, since F satisfies W.P.O, and S is comprehensive, z G {x +
-^+4.)
implies that : ^ 5. Thus 5C V.
Now, since (V, 0) is a symmetric problem, and x is the only symmetric point in
WP(V), by W.P.O. and SYM, F(V, d) = x. Also, since c is the only symmetric point
in WP(T), by W.P.O. and SYM, F{T,d) = e. But co?i(F) = 7\ and so cF(V,d) = c.
Therefore, since 5 C V and cF (V,d) = c£ con(S), by C.MON, F(S,d) < F(V,d) = a;.
There are two possibilities.
i) x £ P{S). Then by W.P.O, F(5,J) = x = NE(S,d) and the proof is complete,
ii) .r P{S). Then consider the sequence of problems {(I/l/ ;0)} and {(S";0)} defined
by:
v> = {v\J comp -c + (l- -js;0
1/ 1/
14
S" *U comp -c + (l - -).r;0 15




Since S'y C V u
,
c
F(V,0) = c and c E con(5 ,/ ), by C.MON and W.P.O. we have
12
F(S l\d) = F(V,d) = xu . But since S" - S, by CONT F(S u ,d) -* F(5,d). T
since xv —» .r, we conclude that F(S,d, ) = x = NE{S,d).
Case 2) S£3fc£.
Let V' = {Vr (J7renn ~(5)}. Since V is symmetric, and x £ H'P(V''). we can replace
(V, 0) above with (V',0) and replicate argument given for Case 1.
The Nash extension solution has two independently interesting properties. As we
noted earlier, on the domain S"on it coincides with the Nash solution. In fact, on the
convex domain, our new axiom, C.MON, along with W.P.O. imply C.IND.
Now consider a domain of "anti-convex problems", S"_ con . This is the class of
probems that satisfy .41 — .43 and the following two additional requirements.
A4) For all x £ S,x > d.
A5) {x £ 3^\t > y V ij £ 5} is convex.
Anti-convex problems are "concave upward" instead of "concave down' 1 and so might
represent economies with increasing marginal returns instead of diminishing marginal re-
turns. In tins seanse, convex and anti-convex economies are polar opposits. It is not hard
to sec that on this domain. W.P.O, S.INV, SYM, and and C.MON imply R.MON. Recall
that the definition of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution A' : S" „„„ C £™ — ft :
•/ fi — (Oil i_ u II
K(S.d) = max[.r £ S
\
x £ con(a(S,d),d).
We show in Conley and Wilkie(1989) that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is characterized
by W.P.O. S.INV, SYM. and R.MON. on ££. thus, on ££_ con the Nash extension coincides
with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. We show this formally in the lemma 2.
Lemma 2. V(S,d) £ ££_„„, NE( 5, d) = K(S.d).
Proof/
Let (5, (/) £ E£_conJ Apply an affine transformation A £ A to (S.d) such that Am/) —
0. and a(A(5),0) = (1.1 1 ). Then A'(A(5),0) is the largest element of \{S) that is on
the 45° line between (0.0 0) and (1. 1 1).
13
Clearly, by A4 and A5, con(A(S)) just the unit simplex. Thus, ciV(A(5),0) = N(con( X(S),
(1/n, 1/n, . .
.
, 1/n) And so NE(\(S),0) is the largest element on \{S) that is on the
45° line between (0,0,..., 0) and (1/n, 1/n, . .
.
, 1/n). Therefore, by S.INV, NE(S,d) =
A'(S,d).
Thus,the Nash extension solution can be seen as hybrid of the Nash and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions that coincides with Nash when, in our language, all compromises are
possible, and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when no efficient and individually rational
compromises are possible. In a similar manner the axiom C.MON, can be seen as a hybrid




4. Implementing the Nash Extension Solution
>
>
In this section we present a non-cooperative game that implements the Nash extension
solution. The problem we have in mind is exactly that studied by Moulin(19S4). We wish to
construct a non-cooperative game in which agents' utility functions are private information
and which gives utility allocations recommended by the Nash extension solution to the
bargaining problem as the unique equilibrium. This is strictly non-cooperative problem.
The agents act purely out of self interest, and can communicate only through the mediator
and never directly. Formally, the result we obtain is similar to those of Binmore at u.l( 1986)
and Rubinstein(19S2), and Herrero(19S9). That is, "the limit of the (unique) subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs, as the discount parameter goes to one. is the utility allocation
prescribed by the Nash extension solution.' 1
We consider the case of two agents, 1 and 2, who have available a set of real economic
alternatives, .4, with a distinguished element, a d E -4, as the disagreement alternative. The
agents have utility functions u\ and u>) defined over .4 which yields the bargaining problem
{S.d). where S C 9ft?. is the image of .4 under the map (u\, ?/•_>) and d is the image of a .
From now on we normalize utilities so that d = (0,0). We will assume that S is strictly
comprehensive and so there exists a continuous, strictly decreasing function / : .ft+ —» ft+,
where f(x) = max{y £ $l+\(x,y) (E S}. We will suppose that the preferences satisfy
the von-Neumann Morgenstern axioms and so we may extend a, to Ai(A), the space of
lotteries defined over .4. We denote by M C R+ image of .\4(A) under the maps ui,u->.
The- pair (M,d) is also a bargaining problem, but with a convex feasible set.
Recall the definition of the Rubinstein alternating offer game. Time is discrete. In
each time period, /. one player gets to propose an allocation in S to the other who can
either accept or refuse. If the second player refuses, the feasible set is discounted at rate c.
and in the next period she makes an offer. If this offer is refused, the feasible set is again
discounted, and player one makes an offer. The game alternates until an offer is accepted.
If no offer is ever accepted, the players obtain the disagreement point.
Let <"> G (O.lj be given, and define the game T{d) as follows. The game has three
15
stages. Stage 1:
Each player chooses and number from the set Pi = [0, 1]. If p\ > po then 1 proposes
an allocation a\ £ .4. Player 2 announces "Yes" or "No".
If player 2 announces "Yes" the game ends with payoffs u\ = Ui(ai ), u 2 = 1*2(^1 )• If
player 2 announces "No ", then the game proceeds to Stage 2.
If p\ < p2 then the roles are reversed, player 2 gets to propose an allocation.
If pi = p2 then a fair coined is tossed to decide who proposes an allocation.
Stage 2:
If pi > p2 then with probability 1 — P2 the bargaining process ends and the outcome
is U\ — uo — 0. With probability p2, the game proceeds to Stage 3.
If Pi < Vi then with probability 1 — p\ the bargaining process ends and the outcome
is \x\ — i/2 = 0. With probability pi, the game proceeds to Stage 3.
Stage 3:
If p\ > p2 then player 2 is chosen as the leader in Rubinstein's alternating offer game
with discount factor 6 applied between offers. Player 2 proposes an element in Ai. Player
1 can accept or reject the offer. If he accepts, then the offer is implemented with the
mediator enforcing the outcome, including any required randomization. If player 1 rejects
2's offer, then from the next time period, play proceeds with 1 making a proposal from
M.
If p\ < p2 then the player's roles above are reversed.
If pi = p>, then a fair coin is tossed to decide who makes the first offer.
We begin with some well known facts.
Fact 1. In the Rubinstein sub-game, for each value of 6 < 1, there exists a unique
equilibrium payoff pair, {.c°{ti)i i'!,(6)) when 1 has the first offer and 2 replies. (x°(6),Xo(6))
when 2 has the first offer and 1 replies.
Fact 2. Lim 6-.i(xl(8),x r2 (8)) = Lim 6^ l {x°l {6),x!2 {6)) = N(M,d).
We now introduce some notation.
Let (x\(6),X2(S)) = {x°{6),x°
2 (6)). Let p{S) be defined as the maximal value of p such
that {p- 8x x (6),p- 6x 2 {6)) £ S.
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fUp(6) < 1, let (ei(S),e2 (£)) = (p *i(*),P x 2 (S)). If p(8) > 1 let (e l (6),e 2 (6)) =
(
K/- 1^) + **f). !(/(**! ) + ^i))-
Lemma 1. For aii 6 < 1 the game r(<5) has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff,
(uJ J uj) = (ci(^),c2 (fl).
Proof/
As 6 is fixed in the proof we drop £ when it appears as an argument. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1, p(6) > 1.
If Pi > po and the game reaches Stage 3, then from Fact 2 the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium continuation payoffs are (8x[,6x2). Now suppose p\ < 1. Then if po < pi, in
stage one, 1 makes an offer to 2. By subgame perfection, 2 will accept an offer, a', if and
only if u 2 (a') > p^x^- By hypothesis, as p(6) > 1, then x 6 nit(S)< thus there exists an
allocation a such that u\(a) = f~ l (p28x%) > p2 6x\, and u 2 (a) = p2 8x2. Thus player 1
will not propose an outcome a' , that yields u 2 (a') > p2 8x%. If p2 = p\, then the previous
argument holds if 1 is chosen to offer, and the symmetric argument if 2 is chosen. Thus
the utility 2 obtains is ^(f(p\6x°
x ) + pi8x?2 )). If p2 > p\ then 2 proposes to player 1. By
subgame perfection, 1 will accept an offer, a'
,
lfui(a') > p\8x°. As p\ < p(8) there exists an
outcome a such that u 2 (a) = f(p\8x°l ) > f(8x\) = x?} > p2 6x° and (/_>("') > p2 <s .r°,. Thus it
is best response for 2 to set p2 > p\. The symmetric argument holds for player 1 if p> < 1.
Thus in any equilibrium it must be that p\ = P2 = 1- However then the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium payoffs are, (\U~ l {8x%) + 8x1), \(f( () -r °i) + <*-<'j)) = (< i(d"), e a (<5)).
Case 2, /3(e) < 1.
Suppose pi < p(6). If p2 < Pi 5 in stage one. 1 makes an offer to 2. By hypothesis,
as pi < p(8)l, then p> (.r j',.r" ) £ int(S). Thus there exists an allocation a such that
"i(") = /
_1
(pj's '''_> ) > P2^'i- A similar argument to Case 1 above, shows that the best
response for 2 to set p2 > p\. The symmetric argument holds for player 1 if p2 < p{8).
Thus it must be that p\ and p_> > p(6).
If p\ > p(6) and P2 > pi , then in stage one, 2 proposes an allocation to 1. By subgame
perfection, 1 will reject any offer a with U\{a) < p\8x°{8). By construction, as p { > p(i
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f{pi8x°(8)) < piSx^iS). Furthermore x^{8) < x 2 {8). Thus the highest payoff that 2 can at-
tain if P2 > p\ is the maximum of f(pi8x°{8)) and pi<$x£(<5)]. However, by hypothesis there
exists a p? < p\ that ensures 2 a payoff of a least p'2 8x2{8) > Max{f(pi8x°(8)),pi8x'^(6)}.
Thus if pi > p(8), then player 2's best response must be p2 < p\. The symmetric
argument holds for player 1 if p2 > p(£). Thus in any equilibrium it must be that
p-j = p2 = p(8). However then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs are,
(p • xi(8),p x 2 (8)) = {ei{8),e 2 {8)).
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. The limit as 6> —» 1 of the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs oi'T(6) is
exactly the Nash-extension solution to the bargaining problem (S,d).
Proof/
From lemma 1 we have that V 8 E{T(8)) — (e\(8), e 2 (8)). ^From Fact 2 we know that
Lim 8 -. 1 {x°1 {8),x r2 {8)) = Lim s^i{x°l {8),x 2~(8)) = N(M,d) Then we have that x$(6) -> x\
and x 2 (8) —> .r.>. Furthermore 8S —-> 5, and therefore 6M —> M. Thus by the definition of
NE(S,d), p(8) —» A) < 1. Therefore, by the continuity of multiplication on -R. E(r(b)) —->




Since Nash's pioneering treatment of the bargaining problem, most authors have main-
tained the assumption of convexity of the feasible set. In this paper we have dispensed with
convexity. We proposed a new solution, the Nash Extension, and demonstrated that it re-
tains several of the desirable features of the Nash solution on the domain of comprehensive
problems, while coinciding with the Nash solution when the problem is convex.
Our main result is a characterization of the new solution, employing a new axiom,
Ethical Monotonicity. Additionally we demonstrate that axiomatic characterizations of
several well known solutions can be extended to the domain of problems that are merely
comprehensive. This does not seem to be a very strong restriction on the domain since ir
is implied by an assumption of freely disposable utility.
This work suggests that the assumption of a convex feasible set is not essential for any
Monotone Path Solution. Since any Monotone Path Solution is well-defined on the domain
of comprehensive problems any characterization found on the domain of convex problems
should be easy to adapt. This class of solutions is discussed and axiomatized Thomson
(19SG), pp52-57. A second class of solutions that are well defined on the domain of convex
problems is the class of strictly concave social welfare functions. The Nash solution is the
most widely known of these. The class of solutions represented by an additively separable
social welfare function has recently been axiomatized by Lensberg(198S). It would be of
interest to see if our method of constructing the Nash Extension could be employed to
define a new solution or solution class on the domain of comprehensive problems, which
coincides with the selection of the given social welfare function or class of functions, when
the problem is convex. A characterization could then be attempted using C.MON or some
similar axiom.
We close by remarking that it may also be of interest to stud}' more general domains.
For example, suppose agents cannot necessarily dispose of utility freely, but they can
some of the time and disagree some of the time," then the we have a domain of proble]
which tlu* feasible sets are star-shaped with respect to the disagreement point.
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In this note we have provided a game that implements the Conley-Wilkie solution
for non-convex bargaining problems, in the same manner that the Rubinstein-Binmore
alternating offer game implements the Nash solution for convex problems. Recently a
game which exactly implements the nash solution, rather than as a limiting case, has been
developed by Howard [1988] It would be interesting to see if we can construct a game that
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